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VISUAL RAPE: A LOOK AT THE
DUBIOUS LEGALITY OF STRIP
SEARCHES
PAUL R.

SHULDINER*

"I feel so scared when I'm in Chicago now. It's like you're going to
be raped or robbed or something. And I can't believe the policemen
here. They have so much authority. It's like they're God or something. It's just not fair."
A false arrestee speaks**

For some time now, law enforcement officers have routinely
conducted post-arrest strip searches of suspects.1 Although
these searches drastically invade the privacy rights of those subjected to this demeaning experience, there has been very little
litigation involving their propriety. 2 Usually, the constitutionality of a search is decided in a suppression hearing 3-an abbreviated proceeding at best. Until recently, the constitutionality of
strip searches was not a central issue in criminal cases nor in
civil suits for damages.
Litigation of strip search problems has produced disparate
judicial holdings. Two trends have emerged, however: (1) the
obvious unwillingness of courts to extend scrutiny beyond the
particular facts and render a broad decision; (2) the avoidance
of federal constitutional adjudication where reliance on state
constitution and statutory policy will suffice. In Tinetti v.
* B.A., University of Massachusetts; J.D., University of Toledo College
of Law. The author is currently an Instructor of Law at The John Marshall
Law School. In conjunction with the preparation of this article for publication, Mr. Shuldiner filed a Brief Amicus Curiae in Tinetti v. Wittke, appeal
docketed, No. 79-2442 (7th Cir. Nov. 30, 1979), urging affirmance of the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 479 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Wis. 1979). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, per
curiam, on April 24, 1980.
** 2 (M)aced out in tow-to-tow row, Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 18, 1979,
at 12, col. 1.
1. See Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968); State v.
Ramos, 11 Ariz. App. 196, 463 P.2d 91 (1969); People v. Woods, 139 Cal. App.
2d 515, 293 P.2d 901 (1956). See generally Eckhardt, Intrusion into the Body,
52 Mm. L. REv. 141 (1971); Simon, Strip Searches, 6 BARRISTER 10 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Simon].
2. Most of the cases have not undertaken an in-depth analysis of these
searches. See State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974). But see
Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968); Rivas v. United States,
368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967).
3. See generally W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE].
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Wittke, 4 currently on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the court
condemned the practice of routine strip searching absent probable cause, but the decision was expressly limited to non-misdemeanor traffic offenders. Most recently, the Illinois Appellate
Court in People v. Seymour5 affirmed an order suppressing evidence discovered after the station house strip search of a misdemeanant entitled by state supreme court rule to post pre-set bail
without being incarcerated. Fourth amendment analysis was
not undertaken, the court relying alternatively on the invasion
of privacy provision of the Illinois Constitution.
National attention was directed to the propriety of strip
searches as the result of publicity surrounding Doe v. City of
Chicago.6 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that women arrested in Chicago were routinely strip searched, regardless of
the circumstances of their arrests or offenses. Some women
were strip searched after posting bail, although their arrests
were for minor traffic violations; others were strip searched
merely because they were in the company of individuals who
were arrested. The city police claimed that this practice was
pursuant to regulations. 7 Incidents of routine strip searches for
no ascertainable reason and for the pettiest offenses began to
surface in other cities.
In Racine, Wisconsin, police strip searched a group of teachers who were arrested for disorderly conduct in connection with
a strike. 8 In Tinetti, police arrested and strip searched a nonresident, who had committed a minor traffic offense, because
she possessed only an out-of-state driver's license. 9 In Houston,
Texas, police routinely strip search female traffic offenders. 10
These incidents are not isolated; rather, they only represent the
tip of the iceberg.
A strip search entails forcing an individual to disrobe, rummaging through clothing, and then forcing the person to bend
4. 479 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Wis. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-2442 (7th
Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
5. 80 Ill. App. 3d 221, 398 N.E.2d 1191 (1979).
6. No. 79 C 789 (N.D. Ill. 1979). A settlement was offered for $1000 for
women who had been subjected to body-cavity searches and $250 for
"mere" strip searches. Further, the Chicago Police Department admitted
no wrongdoing. General Stipulation and Order, Mar. 27, 1980.
7. See Simon, supra note 1; McIntyre & Chabraja, The Intensive Search
of a Suspect's Body and Clothing, 58 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 18 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as McIntyre & Chabrajal. This article purports to study

the practice of the Chicago Police of strip searching 20,000 female arrestees
annually. The basis for this policy seems to lie in the supposition that women have more places to hide weapons than men.
8. Simon, supra note 1.

9. 479 F. Supp. at 487.
10. Simon, supra note 1.
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over and spread his or her legs to expose the genital and anal
areas. 1' A body-cavity search consists of the additional step of
probing the individual's anal or vaginal cavity.12 To the person
being strip searched, there is in reality very little difference between a body-cavity search and a strip search. 13 However,
courts have scrutinized strip searches under less stringent
fourth amendment standards than those used for body-cavity
searches. 14 Most notably, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have distinguished strip searches from body-cavity searches.' 5 To initiate a strip search, a border official must have a "real suspicion
supported by objective, articulable facts" that narcotics, weapons, or evidence of crime are concealed on the person.' 6 To conduct a body-cavity search, however, there must be a "clear
indication" that narcotics, weapons, or evidence of crime will be
17
found.
This differentiation disregards the individual expectations
of privacy and considerations of human dignity which should
control the power of an officer to force one to disrobe. In essence, the glassy eyes of an arrestee would support an officer's
"real suspicion" that drugs would be found. The ensuing strip
search might result in the officer finding further evidence, such
as a greasy substance near the body cavity. This discovery
would satisfy the "clear indication" requirement, and the officer
would be justified in performing a body-cavity search.' 8 The rationale supporting this strained distinction is formulated from
the perspective of the state's evidentiary needs, rather than the
11. See People v. Woods, 139 Cal. App. 2d 515, 293 P.2d 901 (1956).
12. Id.; cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (pretrial detainees).

13. Cf. United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.
Wis. 1974) (pregnant woman); State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51
(1974) (cannot strip search unless there is a "clear indication"). But see

Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968); People v. Woods, 139
Cal. App. 2d 515, 293 P.2d 901 (1956).
14. See People v. Woods, 139 Cal. App. 2d 515, 293 P.2d 901 (1956). A strip
search can be conducted pursuant to a "real suspicion" that drugs are being
smuggled, while in order to institute a body search, the official must have a
clear indication. Id.
15. Compare United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Price, 472 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1973); and United States v. Castle, 409 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1969) with Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366
(9th Cir. 1968).

16. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966); cf. United
States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978) (partial corroboration from
reliable source); United States v. Price, 472 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1973) (looked
as though something was under clothing).
17. See Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 945 (1967); cf. Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968)
(there was a lack of clear indication).
18. See People v. Woods, 139 Cal. App. 2d 515, 293 P.2d 901 (1956).
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individual's privacy expectations. 19 The law of searches inci20
dent to arrest does not support this rationale.
The lack of cases addressing the constitutionality of strip
searches has fostered confusion in both federal and state courts.
By analyzing these searches in light of fourth amendment and
due process standards, courts should recognize that police and
border officials cannot conduct strip searches based on standards less rigorous than those used for body-cavity searches. In
balancing privacy rights against the interests of the state, both
fourth amendment 2' and due process standards 22 require officers to obtain warrants based upon probable cause prior to
conducting strip searches. In controlling strip searches, legislatures must take cognizance of the need to interpose judicial warrant machinery prior to both strip searches and body-cavity
searches.
HISTORICAL BASES OF STRIP SEARCH ANALYSIS

The United States Supreme Court has not had occasion to
pass directly on the constitutionality of strip searches incident
to lawful arrests. Other Court opinions on ancillary issues must
be analyzed, however. This requires consideration of fourth and
fourteenth amendment problems.
Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment vests every individual with the right
to be free from unreasonable searches 23 and creates a right of
19. But see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (police power must
be balanced with individual rights).

20. See notes 109-30 and accompanying text infra.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides in relevant part: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (recognized expectation of privacy as basis of fourth amendment).
22. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV; see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952) (shocks the Court's conscience).
23. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Katz, Justice Harlan reasoned in a concurring opinion:
The question, however, is what protection it affords to those people
....
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
"reasonable."
389 U.S. at 361; see United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 716 (9th Cir. 1976).
That people have an expectation in the privacy of their bodies and that society deems such expectation reasonable is without question. See United
States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis. 1974); cf.
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privacy. 24 In protecting this right, the Court has read certain requirements into the amendment. The most significant is that a
warrant issued on probable cause must be obtained before a
search takes place. 25 The purpose of the warrant is to interpose
a neutral party between the police officer and the individual. In
Johnson v. United States,26 the Court explained that:
IT]he point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of fer27
reting out crime.
Absent certain exceptional circumstances, the warrant requirement is absolute. The Court in Katz v. United States28 clarified
the scope of the fourth amendment, stating that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and
'29
well-delineated exceptions.
The most important and widespread exception to the warrant requirement is the search incident to arrest. 30 This exception arose from the common law rule which sought to protect
the officer, prevent the escape of the arrestee, and gather eviSchmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (dignity and sanctity of the
body).
24. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
The Brinegar Court stated:
Because many situations which confront officers in the source of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed
for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of
probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, non-technical
conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would
unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law
abiding citizens at the mercy of the officer's whim or caprice.
Id. at 176.
Probable cause has come to mean more than bare suspicion. One must
consider facts and circumstances within one's knowledge, reasonably trustworthy information. Id. at 175; see Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694
(1931).
26. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
27. Id. at 13-14; accord, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
28. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29. Id. at 357; see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); cf.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (must determine whether
the search was reasonable); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950)
(not whether it was reasonable to procure warrant).
30. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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dence which would otherwise be concealed or destroyed.3 1 The
exception has evolved into the principal justification for
of incident searches far exceeds
searches. In fact, the number
32
those pursuant to warrants.
Within the context of incident searches, the analysis must
not stop at the arrest. The scope of a search must be governed
by the reasons for conducting it.33 Generally, the reasons for
conducting searches incident to arrest are to disarm the arrestee
so to protect the officer and to gather evidence which may otherwise be destroyed. 34 Incident to an arrest, "it is reasonable for
the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to
resist arrest or. effect his escape" 35 and also "to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent
its concealment or destruction. '36 Until recently, however, it
was unclear whether the right to conduct these searches was
truly incidental to the arrest, 37 or whether such searches could
only be performed when facts indicated some likelihood that either evidence or weapons would be found.3 8 In United States v.
Robinson,3 9 the Supreme Court held that a complete and thorough search could be conducted incident to an arrest.
Those advocating the legitimacy of strip searches rely on
Robinson.40 There, the Court held that once an individual is
lawfully arrested, "a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
but is also a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment."'4 1 The
31. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968) (can protect one's self).
32. See LAFAVE, supra note 3, at § 2.1.

33. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The scope has generally been

limited to disarming the arrestee and in procuring evidence which would
otherwise be destroyed. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
34. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).
35. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); see Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968).
36. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969); see Schmerber v. Cali-

fornia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood test).
37. E.g., United States v. Simmons, 302 A.2d 728 (D.C. App. 1973); Watts
v. State, 196 So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1967); State v. Coles, 20 Ohio Misc. 12, 249
N.E.2d 553 (1969); State v. Giragosian, 107 R.I. 657, 270 A.2d 921 (1970); Lane

v. State, 424 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
38. E.g., People v. West, 31 Cal. App. 3d 175, 107 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1973);
People v. Jordan, 11 Ill. App. 3d 482, 297 N.E.2d 373 (1973); State v. Curtis, 290
Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d 631 (1971); People v. Adams, 32 N.Y.2d 451, 299 N.E.2d
653, 346 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1973); Commonwealth v. Freedman, 222 Pa. Super. Ct.
178, 293 A.2d 84 (1972).

39. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
40. See State v. Magness, 115 Ariz. 317, 565 P.2d 194 (1977).

41. 414 U.S. at 235.
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"police officer's determination as to how and where to search the
person of a suspect . . . is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment" 42 which the Court will uphold with no further examination into probable cause for the scope and intensity of the
search. The officer's judgment controls in the absence of bad
faith or gross misconduct.
For the purpose of determining the validity of a strip search
conducted in connection with an arrest, particular attention
43
must be focused upon the permissible intensity of the search.
Most of the Court's fourth amendment holdings have dealt primarily with the scope of searches incident to arrest. Since the
concern regarding strip searches is with their intensity, and because it has been impliedly accepted that the arrestee's person
is subject to a search for weapons or evidence of the crime for
which he was arrested,4 it is of little assistance to analyze strip
searches in light of traditional "search incident to" principles.
The intensity of a search is rarely analyzed because the impor45
tant concern normally has been with the scope of the search.
In general, courts have rarely considered whether a search
within a proper scope has gone beyond the permissible intensity.
The Robinson Court did not analyze the intensity of the in42. Id. The Court explicitly rejected the need for any case by case adju-

dication. See Gilligan, Search of Premises, Vehicles, and the Individual Incident to Apprehension, 61 MR. L. REv. 89 (1973).
43. See notes 48-61 and accompanying text infra. Few Supreme Court

cases have addressed the permissible intensity of searches. See, e.g.,
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S.
432 (1957); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); see Huguez v. United
States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968) (applied Rochin).
44. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), where the Court ex-

plained why the cases concerning the scope of the search could not be used
to analyze the intensity of the search, stating:

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest
itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in
order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary
items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in
a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.
There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control"-construing that
phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of
a weapon or destructible evidence.
Id. at 763.
45. The intensity of a search has been addressed in three major cases.
See note 43 supra.
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trusion in that case. Rather, the majority noted that the facts of
that particular search disclosed reasonable behavior on the part
of the arresting officer.46 A decision on a search more intensive
than the one condoned in Robinson was reserved for another
case. 47 Further, no strip search is conducted truly incidental to
an arrest; rather, it is performed in a stationhouse or jail. It
could be argued that the time and space limitations of incident
searches would foreclose a strip search.
The Intensity of Bodily Invasions
The Supreme Court has ruled on the permissible intensity
of the search of a suspect in three cases. The first, Rochin v. California,48 invoked the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment in declaring the forced stomach pumping of a narcotics suspect unconstitutional. State officers had broken into
the defendant's abode without a warrant and, upon seeing him
hurriedly swallowing capsules, transported him to a hospital
where, without obtaining a warrant, his stomach was forcibly
pumped. The Court concluded that the evidence retrieved from
defendant's stomach was inadmissible because the conduct of
the police was too brutal to be tolerated. 49 It held:
[This] is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking
into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth
and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's
contents-this course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They
are methods too close to50 the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.
46. 414 U.S. at 236; see id. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring), 'The search
incident to arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the
privacy interest protected by that constitutional guarantee is legitimately
abated by the fact of arrest."

47. Id. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the Court held that a pretrial detainee could be strip searched after seeing visitors. However, Bell
can be distinguished from the normal pretrial detainee case because there
the officials had probable cause to believe that Wolfish was smuggling arti-

cles into the jail. First, Wolfish had committed a violent offense; second, it
was a common occurrence for drugs and weapons to be smuggled in

through body cavities; finally, in the other type of cases, that is where there
is no probable cause to believe drugs or weapons are being smuggled (i.e.,
when there is no history of drug use, absent needle marks, glassy eyes, or
appearance of carrying something), then there can be no search. See
United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
48. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
49. Id. at 171; accord, United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.
1974); see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). But see Breithaupt v.

Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(there was no brutality); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967).
50. 342 U.S. at 172; cf.White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (arbitrary violation of one's fundamental rights).
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Although the evidence was excluded, the Court relied on a
fourteenth, not fourth amendment analysis. 51 Thus, even
though searches comport with the requirements of the fourth
amendment, the conduct of the state in procuring evidence may
violate the fourteenth. 52 The guiding light for courts in assessing whether conduct "shocks the conscience" is whether the
"canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English-speaking peoples" are offended. 53 Although it
is difficult to say where judges should look to find these "canons
of decency," this vague criterion can be applied in a manner
which yields predictable results.
In Breithaupt v. Abram,54 the Court looked to the degree of
brutality employed by the police. In Breithaupt, a sample of
blood was taken from an unconscious driver after an accident.
He was convicted of manslaughter, the alcohol content of the
blood sample indicating that he had been intoxicated at the time
of the accident. In ruling on the propriety of this invasion by
police, the Court first looked to the manner in which it was performed. Concluding that it was hardly offensive to undergo a
blood test in a hospital, the Court distinguished Rochin by not55
ing the absence of brutality attributable to the police.
Rochin's due process test was clarified by the Court's following
statement:, "Due process is not measured by the yardstick of
personal reaction or the sphygmogram of the most sensitive person, but by that whole community sense of 'decency and fairness' that has been woven by common experience into the fabric
of acceptable conduct. '5 6 However, courts must equally be
aware that application of the Rochin doctrine cannot be stric51. Reliance was placed on a violation of those standards of decency

and ordered liberty expected by society. This infringed Rochin's due process rights. 342 U.S. at 172.

52. No court has held that a search which "shocks the court's conscience" is a per se fourth amendment violation. Cf.Katz v. United States,

389 U.S. 347 (1967) (recognized expectation of privacy which is violated if
invasion is not pursuant to a warrant).
53. 342 U.S. at 169; cf. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979)
(Rochin due process argument not limited to brutality involved).
The problem with reliance on a due process analysis is that there is a

chance judges will apply a subjective standard of what they believe the law
should be today. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see L.
TRIBE, CONSTrTrTIONAL LAw 1097 (1977) (applying a logical sense of right-

eousness to reason out opinions).
54. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
55. Id. at 435; accord, Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966),

cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967); see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966); cf.United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (conduct was not
unreasonable).

56. 352 U.S. at 436.
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57
tured to the thinking of one court at one particular time.
Another traffic case, Schmerber v. California,58 completed
the Court's analytical trilogy of the permissible intensity of
searches. Blood was extracted from a conscious driver who had
been involved in an accident. The suspect had refused on advice
of counsel to submit to the blood test. The totality of the circumstances legitimated the invasion because the test had taken
place in a hospital and had been administered by a physician.
The Court set forth a test to determine the legality of invasions of the body in searches for evidence.5 9 This test was not
associated with due process; rather, it was predicated on the
fourth amendment. It mandated a "clear indication" that evidence to convict the suspect for the crime for which he was ar60
rested would be found by intruding beyond the body surface.
The Court reasoned:
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere
chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of
a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these
fundamental interests require law officers to suffer the risk that
may disappear unless there is an immediate
such evidence
61

search.

Together these cases set forth the fourth and fourteenth
amendment limitations imposed on the intensity of searches. In
summary, the law on bodily invasions is that first, there must be
a clear indication that the suspect is secreting weapons, evidence, or contraband. Second, efforts to extract this evidence
must not be offensive or shocking to the conscience. Finally, the
measure of whether the conduct is offensive is the concept embodied in traditional notions of decency and fairness.
Bell v. Wolfish
The Supreme Court has never had occasion to apply these
constitutional criteria to a strip search incident to an arrest. The
Court has only recently addressed the propriety of conducting
strip and body-cavity searches. 6 2 In Bell v. Woflfsh, 63 the respondents were pretrial detainees confined in the Metropolitan
57. See White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
58. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
59. Id. at 770 (clear indication test); accord, Huguez v. United States,
406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967). But this test is not used for "mere"
strip searches. See notes 11-18 and accompanying text supra.
60. 384 U.S. at 770.
61. Id.
62. E.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).

63. Id.
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Correctional Center (MCC), a federally operated short-term
custodial facility in New York City. They complained of both
the overcrowded conditions at the facility and the strip searching of those detainees returning from the facility's visiting
center. The government contended that the searches were conducted because of increased drug traffic and weapons discoveries within the facility. 64 However, these searches had not
markedly decreased drug traffic or availability of weapons. 65 Respondents argued that the searches violated their fourth, eighth,
and fourteenth amendment due process rights. The government
countered, claiming that providing security for the prisoners
was a compelling interest.
The Court analyzed the complaint on the basis that the respondents had been arrested; thus, their constitutional rights
were diminished in comparison to individuals who had committed no offense. 66 In rejecting respondents' claims that the strip
searches violated their constitutional rights, the Court classified
67
the pretrial detainees in the same category as convicted felons.
This determination was itself improper since the due process
clause affords more protection to those not convicted of crimes
64. Other facilities had allowed such searches. See, e.g., Ferraro v.
United States, No. 78-5250 (6th Cir. Dec. 15, 1978); United States v. Park, 521
F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1975).
65. Only one person was caught smuggling drugs into the facility. Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559.
66. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S.
119,125 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974); Pell v. Procunier,

417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). The Morrissey Court said:
Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains
what process is due. It has been said so often by this Court and others
as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. "[C] onsideration of what procedures due process may require
under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination
of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of
the private interest that has been affected by governmental action."
To say that the concept of due process is flexible does not mean
that judges are at large to apply it to any and all relationships. Its flexibility is in its scope once it has been determined that some process is
due; it is a recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.
408 U.S. at 481.
67. But see McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 273 (1972) (Court shielded
person awaiting trial from potentially oppressive governmental actions);
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1952) (right to bail preserves presumption of
innocence). See also Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978). The presumption or assumption of innocence that is indulged in until evidence has convinced a jury to the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt, colors all of the
government's actions toward persons not yet convicted. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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than those who have been. 68 Second, the classification violated
the equal protection rights of those pretrial detainees who, not
69
being able to post bail, were denied constitutional protections.
The group detained in Bell was actually confined due to
70
financial status rather than guilt or dangerousness.
Granted, "lawful incarceration brings about the necessary
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.''71 However, withdrawals based upon an individual's
financial ability work a grave disservice to the expectations of
privacy and due process guaranteed by the fourth, fifth, and
fourteenth amendments. In effect, a pretrial detainee has the
constitutional rights of a man presumed guilty until he has
72
proven his innocence.
68. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978); see McGinnis v. Royster, 410
U.S. 263 (1972); cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process is
flexible).
69. The dissent in Bell v. Wolfish stated:
The fact that an individual may be unable to pay for a bail bond,
however, is an insufficient reason for subjecting him to indignities that
would be appropriate punishment for convicted felons. Nor can he be
subject on that basis to onerous restraints that might properly be considered regulatory with respect to particularly obstreperous or dangerous arrestees. An innocent man who has no propensity toward
immediate violence, escape, or subversion may not be dumped into a
pool of second-class citizens and subjected to restraints designed to
regulate others who have. For him, such treatment amounts to punishment. And because the due process guarantee is individual and personal, it mandates that an innocent person be treated as an individual
human being and be free of treatment which, as to him, is punishment.
441 U.S. at 583-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf.Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (must treat each person differently).
70. There is a large class of persons for whom any bail at all is "excessive bail." They are the people loosely referred to as "indigents." See H.
PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 216 n.10 (1968). This could

be a "logical corollary to the 'No Excess Bail' Clause." 441 U.S. at 583 n.13
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. 441 U.S. at 546; Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948); see Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
72. Cf.Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 589-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting):
There is no question that jail administrators have a legitimate interest in preventing smuggling. But it is equally clear that that interest
is being served here in a way that punishes many if not all of the detainees.
The challenged practices concededly deprive detainees of fundamental rights and privileges of citizenship beyond simply the right to
leave. The Court recognizes the premise, but it dismisses its significance by asserting that detainees may be subjected to the "withdrawal
or limitation" of fundamental rights. I disagree. The withdrawal of
rights is itself among the most basic punishments that society can exact, for such a withdrawal qualifies the subject's citizenship and violates his dignity. Without question that kind of harm is an "affirmative
disability" that "has historically been regarded as a punishment."
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Assuming that it is permissible to conduct strip searches in
certain cases, the determination of when to conduct them cannot be settled arbitrarily by administrative processes. Deprivation of a person's fourth amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures constitutes imposition of a
penalty of the highest magnitude, especially since the pretrial
73
detainee may not have committed any crime.
Of course, security interests were of paramount importance
in Bell v. Wolfish. However, intrusions into individuals' expectations of privacy must not only be considered in light of the place
in which searches are conducted, but also with due regard to
"the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is
conducted, and the justification for initiating it."' 74 Although a
great number and variety of contraband articles were being
smuggled into the facility, the searches of all returning convicts
and pretrial detainees resulted in the discovery of only one inmate having contraband on his person. 75 The fact that smuggling continued indicated that a permissible scope for searches
still existed. However, the Court failed to address the justifica76
tion for conducting these searches arbitrarily and en masse.
The fourth amendment provides that searches may only be
conducted on probable cause.77 Although this right may be restricted for pretrial detainees, it is not non-existent, nor should
it be diminished to the level allowed convicted felons. 78 The justification must be arrived at by balancing each individual's circumstances with the government's interest. 79 In Bell, the fact
that only one person was caught severely undermines the government's interest. Once that interest has been satisfied, the
government cannot continue the search; to do so would be even
more unreasonable. 80 Before a search can be conducted, cir73. Id.
74. Id. at 559; see United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
75. 441 U.S. at 559. The Court reasoned that the arbitrary search served
as a deterrent. But the dissent argued that the search was not purposeful
and therefore beyond the scope and intensity of a permissible search.

76. Once the purpose for the search has been satisfied, the search must
cease. See United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; accord, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56 (1950); cf.Massey v. Wilson, No. 79-C-652 (D. Colo. Feb. 29, 1980) (refused
to dismiss suit to redress fourth amendment rights infringed by prison strip
searches).

78. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
79. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
80. United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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cumstances amounting to probable cause must exist. 8 1 The fact
that detainees have received visitors may be considered, but
that alone should not be controlling where previous history indicates that these visits rarely result in smuggling.
Less intrusive searches would be adequate. 82 Mr. Justice
Stevens suggests that having metal detectors such as those used
83
for airlines would be much more effective and less intrusive.
To detect the smuggling of drugs, dogs could be used which are
even more sensitive than the human eye or fingers. Thus, there
are less intrusive means for securing prisons.
Although the Bell Court did apply a fourth amendment
analysis to the issue of the body-cavity searches, it failed to examine anything beyond the permissible scope. It failed to apply
previous fourth amendment analysis because it assumed that
pretrial detainees have restricted constitutional rights. Therefore, the Court's reasoning was faulty. It did not include analysis pertaining to the permissible intensity of the searches.
Although Bell was a pretrial detainee case, and not directly relevant to search incident problems, the decision provides lower
courts authority for upholding strip searches.
STRIP SEARCHES IN ILLINOIS

The public uproar over strip searches emanated from the
publicity surrounding these searches in Chicago. Illinois is one
of the few states to condemn strip searches conducted absent
probable cause. 84 In Newell v. City of Elgin,85 the Illinois Appellate Court reversed an order dismissing a civil rights action
brought under the Illinois and United States Constitutions. The
court held that a cause of action arose when the police for no
81. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
82. United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 149 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).

83. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 594-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. See, e.g., People v. Seymour, 80 Ill. App. 3d 221, 398 N.E.2d 1191
(1979); cf. Newell v. City of Elgin, 34 Ill. App. 3d 719, 340 N.E.2d 344 (1976) (a
cause of action lies where strip search is conducted and there is no probable cause); P.A. 81-896, 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. (West) (prescribes standards
for strip and body-cavity searches).
85. 34 Ill. App. 3d 719, 340 N.E.2d 344 (1976). In Newell, plaintiff was rid-

ing his motorcycle when the police forced him off the road, injuring him.
"'[01 ne or more' of the eight police officers ordered plaintiff to remove his
boots, shirts and trousers; when plaintiff refused to . . . remove his trousers, physical force was used to the extent that plaintiff consented to do it."

Id. at 720, 340 N.E.2d at 346. The court cited Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), supporting a cause of action under the

fourth amendment, and People v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 45 N.E.2d 997 (1942) for
a cause of action under the Illinois Constitution. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6
(1970).
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apparent reason stopped the plaintiff, arrested him, and forced
him to strip.
In People v. Seymour,86 the defendant was arrested for a
misdemeanor for which an Illinois Supreme Court Rule had set
a predetermined bail amount. 87 The police never informed Seymour that he could post bond and leave the station without being locked up or strip searched. 88 Instead, the police kept
Seymour at the station for over two hours and strip searched
him. They found a small packet of cocaine in his sock. The
Cook County Circuit Court suppressed the evidence. The appellate court affirmed, holding that failure to inform defendant of
his right to post bail could not be condoned by allowing police
the use of the evidence. 89
The court alternatively stated that Illinois' invasion of privacy constitutional provision protected citizens from "highly intrusive invasions." The court analyzed:
The right to privacy protects only against unreasonable intrusions. Lawful incarceration deprives prisoners of many of the
rights and privileges of other citizens, and warrantless searches of
jail cells and prisoners under certain conditions do not violate article I, section 6. But the strip search of an individual arrested for a
misdemeanor offense who has the funds in his possession to imme86. 80 Ill. App. 3d 221, 398 N.E.2d 1191 (1979). In Seymour, defendant
was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon. The police conducted four
pat down searches, a strip search and a body-cavity search. They found a
minute quantity of drugs hidden inside a sock. The court outlined the types
of searches that police perform, stating:
Before discussing these rationales, it is useful to draw distinctions between the various types of searches of an individual's person. Taken in
the order by which they intrude into an individual's privacy, they are:
First, the "pat-down," in which police frisk a suspect's outer clothing in
order to find concealed weapons; second, the "pocket search," in which
police rummage through a suspect's pockets, usually to find weapons
but also to find the fruits of a crime or contraband; third, the "clothing
search," in which police closely examine a suspect's clothes; fourth, the
"strip search," in which a suspect is forced to strip naked under the
glaring eye of a police examination; fifth, the "body cavity search," in
which police strip the suspect naked and examine all openings of the
body where contraband or weapons could be secreted; sixth, the "body
intrusion," in which the examination goes beyond the outer limits of a
suspect's body and the police pump the stomach or remove the blood
without consent.
Id. at 224, 398 N.E.2d at 1193.
87. See, e.g, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, 528-530 (1979).
88. See P.A. 81-896, 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. (West).
89. People v. Seymour, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 229-30, 398 N.E.2d at 1196-97;
accord, United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972); People v.
Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 538 P.2d 753, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1975); People v.
Overlee, 174 Colo.202, 483 P.2d 222 (1971); People v. Dixon, 392 Mich. 691, 222
N.W.2d 749 (1974); see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (the
fruits of the breach cannot be used to insure that the rights will not be
breached in the future).
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diately post bond and be released is not reasonable. A strip search
can be justified when "the modesty of one lawfully arrested must
give way to reasonable precautionary procedures designed to detect hidden evidence, drugs or objects which might be used against
others or to cause self-inflicted harm." However, when the defendant is charged only with a misdemeanor and may gain his release
90
immediately, his modesty and privacy must remain inviolate.
The court saw no reason to undertake fourth and fourteenth
amendment analysis. It hinted, however, that if Seymour could
not have posted bail, or had committed a felony, a strip search
could have been conducted. 9 1 By indicating that strip searches
must conform to the same search and seizure standards controlling body-cavity searches, the Illinois Appellate Court went beyond the standards recently established by the Illinois
legislature. 9 2 The legislature, like the Fifth and Ninth Circuits,
established a "reasonable belief' test for strip searches while
imposing a "probable cause" standard for body-cavity searches.
The Seymour court, however, did not rely on or mention the
statute.
OTHER LOWER COURT TREATMENT OF STRIP SEARCHES

In analyzing strip searches incident to arrest, it is helpful to
consider four different situations premised on the cause for the
arrest. 93 The first scenario involves defendants arrested for narcotics violations. 94 In these cases, the official generally has
90. 80 Ill. App. 3d at 230, 398 N.E.2d at 1197-98. The court continued, stating that when a defendant is charged only with a misdemeanor and could
regain his release immediately, the police must protect his privacy rights.
Seymour had no fruits of crime on him, and a search for contraband was
unjustified since he did not need to be locked up.
91. Id. at 231, 398 N.E.2d at 1197. The court stated, "Lawful incarceration
deprives prisoners of many of the rights and privileges of other citizens, and
warrantless searches of jail cells and prisoners under certain conditions do
not violate article I, section 6." Id. at 230, 398 N.E.2d at 1197-98; People v.
Elkins, 60 Ill. App. 3d 883, 377 N.E.2d 569 (1978); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520 (1979).
92. 80 Ill. App. 3d at 230, 398 N.E.2d at 1197-98; P.A. 81-896, 1979 Ill. Legis.
Serv.; see notes 177-85 and accompanying text infra.
93. The first scenario is when the search is pursuant to a drug-related
arrest, see notes 94-100 and accompanying text infra; the second is when the
search is incident to an arrest for a violent crime, see notes 101-04 and accompanying text infra; the third is when the search is pursuant to a traffic
violation, see notes 105-06 and accompanying text infra; and the final scenario is when the search is conducted despite the absence of a criminal violation, see notes 107-09 and accompanying text infra.
94. See, e.g., State v. Ramos, 11 Ariz. App. 196, 463 P.2d 91 (1969). In Ramos, the court stated:
[E]yewitness report of an actual crime gave the officer probable cause
to arrest. Reliable informant provided information led to three arrests
and one conviction; informant stated he actually had seen the heroin in
defendant's possession. We also believe that the officers, on the basis
of the information, had the right, incident to a lawful arrest, to conduct
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some indication that the defendant is harboring a controlled
substance. Within the Fifth and Ninth Circuits and in many
states, a strip search can be conducted pursuant to a "real suspicion" that drugs are being concealed. 95 The real suspicion test is
satisfied when the arrestee has glassy eyes, recent needle
marks, or acts as though he is hiding something. 96 While conducting a strip search, the official may expose more evidence
such as grease at the opening of the body cavity. 97 This would
the strip search of defendant's person for the specific evidence which
they were told could be found.
Id. at 199, 463 P.2d at 93; People v. Woods, 139 Cal. App. 2d 515, 293 P.2d 901
(1956) (defendant had glassy eyes and recent needle marks); see Morales v.
United States, 406 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1969) (20% of body-cavity searches
performed are productive). See generally McIntyre & Chabraja, supra note
7.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th
Cir. 1967); People v. Woods, 139 Cal. App. 2d 515, 293 P.2d 901 (1956).
96. United States v. Mastberg, 503 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1974). The Mastberg
court stated:
In analyzing our border search cases, we find that certain factors have
been instrumental in establishing a real suspicion of smuggling. Also,
certain factors tend to bear a more direct relationship to suspicion of
smuggling than others. Some of these factors are present in this case.
For example, a person's nervousness while crossing the border is frequently a fact taken into account in determining whether to conduct a
strip search or body-cavity search. Similarly, needle marks on the person's arms are frequently a factor. Both of these elements were present
in this case. In addition, there were the open milk cartons and the balloons. A customs inspector testified that addicts often carry liquids
with them and frequently conceal contraband drugs in body cavities by
using balloons.
Obviously, some of the factors in the present case are more important than others in determining whether a real suspicion of smuggling
was established. If we were to consider each of the factors separately,
the needle marks would be the most likely indication of smuggling and
the element to which we lend greater weight. In degree of relative importance, nervousness would rank next. Neither the needle marks nor
the nervousness can be considered totally innocuous. However, the
milk containers and balloons each considered separately could be totally innocuous and are the least likely indication of smuggling. Many
persons crossing the border probably carry balloons or open liquid containers and yet do not arouse a suspicion of smuggling. The open liquid
containers and the balloons, even when considered together, could be
totally innocuous. However, we do not view each of these separately to
determine the reasonableness of the search. We must consider the totality of the factors, viewing them in the light of an experienced customs inspector, when determining the legality of the strip search.
Id. at 468-69; see United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1976) (pinpointed eyes, slurred speech and recent needle marks); United States v.
Holtz, 479 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973) (defendant arrived with two men who had
fresh needle marks, computer check list indicated one man had history of
being a heroin dealer); United States v. Shields, 453 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1972)
(nervous, needle marks and stay in Mexico was unusually short); People v.
Woods, 139 Cal. App. 2d 515, 293 P.2d 901 (1956).
97. See, e.g., People v. Woods, 139 Cal. App. 2d 515, 293 P.2d 901 (1956); Cf.
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create a clear indication that drugs will be found, and a bodycavity search can be conducted. 98 In such circumstances, courts
have refused to apply Rochin.99 But where there are exceptional circumstances, such as the defendant is seven months
pregnant or is physically brutalized, the courts generally will apply the Rochin doctrine. 100
Within the first group of cases, the courts could apply a
probable cause standard and protect the interests of the state at
the same time. One interest is to gather evidence of the crime of
smuggling a controlled substance. In the second group of cases,
where the defendant is arrested for a violent crime, 10 1 the state
United States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973). But see Note, From Bags
to Body Cavities. The Law of Border Searches, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1974),
which analyzed strip searches at the border for lesser cause than body-cavity searches. The article states:
Indeed, considerations of human dignity may require that any search in
which a suspect must expose vagina and/or anus to examination be
subject to a higher standard of justification than that required for the
skin search. It is one thing to be made to stand denuded before an inspector of one's own sex; it is quite another to endure a sharp-eyed
probe of one's rectal or vaginal area, or to suffer the indignity of having
one's anal surface wiped for tell-tale signs of lubricating grease. To call
this invasion a strip search is a nonsensical classification for it is nearly
as humiliating as the probe of the cavity itself. The body cavity probe
standard should be applied to both.
Id. at 79-80.
It should also be noted that these courts have distinguished between
searches of men and women. See Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805
(9th Cir. 1967). In Henderson, the court stated that a strip search ended and
a body-cavity search began when a woman "manually open[ed] her vagina
for visual inspection to see if she [had] something concealed there . .. ."
Id. at 808. In Morales v. United States, 406 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1969), the
Ninth Circuit suppressed evidence when the border official saw a packet of
heroin protruding from the vaginal cavity. There the cavity was not penetrated. In United States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973), the Ninth Circuit stepped back from its Morales holding and held that only a "real
suspicion" was needed when the border official saw a prophylactic, containing heroin, hang down from the vagina. See generally Note, From Bags to
Body Cavities.- The Law of Border Searches, 74 COLUm. L. REV. 53, 57-81
(1974).
98. Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 945 (1967); People v. Woods, 139 Cal. App. 2d 515, 293 P.2d 901 (1956).
This complies with the standards established by Schmerber. See Huguez v.
United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968).
99. See, e.g., Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967); People v. Woods, 139 Cal. App. 2d 515, 293 P.2d 901
(1956). The courts have generally restricted Rochin to its facts. See
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
100. See, e.g., Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968) (no
clear indication, and the search was not sanitary); United States ex rel. Guy
v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (plaintiff was seven months
pregnant).
101. See State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974). In Kaluna, defendant was arrested after a robbery. The police initiated a strip search.
Defendant gave the police a small rolled up package. The policewoman
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interest is weaker. Here, the state's interest is to protect the police officer and to maintain safety in jails. 0 2 However, when the
police are satisfied that the arrestee is carrying no weapons, the
search must cease. 10 3 Secondly, even here, the police must have
10 4
probable cause to conduct the search.
A situation where the officer is even less likely to find a controlled substance or a weapon on the defendant is when he is
arrested for a traffic violation. 10 5 Here, the courts almost uniformly condemn the police practice of conducting strip and
body-cavity searches. 10 6 Finally, where the defendant was
merely accompanying a drug user, or as in People v. Seymour
held at the station longer than needed, the courts have generally
condemned strip searches. 10 7 However, if there is reason to support the search, the courts do sometimes justify the invasion. 0 8
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF STRIP SEARCHES

The Need for Stringent Fourth Amendment Safeguards
Lower courts' varied analyses of strip searches illustrate
that their constitutionality is an unsettled issue. As illustrated
by the lower court cases, few jurisdictions apply traditional
search and seizure analysis. Rather, the courts and the police
regard extensive searches of the body incident to an arrest as
opened the package and found a controlled substance. The court suppressed the evidence because the search should have ended when the policewoman was sure that defendant did not possess a weapon. At that
point, the interest of the government was satisfied. But cf. Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520 (1979) (court held that when prisoners are taken into custody
they can be strip searched to ensure safety of prison).
102. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (pretrial detainees); State v.
Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974).
103. United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972); State v. Kaluna,
55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974).
104. State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974). But see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
105. See Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Tinetti
v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Wis. 1979); People v. Mercurio, 10 Cal. App.
3d 426, 88 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1970). In Mercurio, the court recognized that the
police had a right to conduct a complete search of the person. But it
pointed out that a simple traffic violation, standing alone, ordinarily does
not justify a generalized search of the person. "A traffic violation ordinarily
involves no tangible property; hence no implement or fruit of the crime or
infraction will be found and any search beyond that required for protection
against violence is an unjustified intrusion." Id. at 429, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
107. Williams v. State, 338 So. 2d 233 (Fla. App. 1976); cf. United States v.
Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978) (companion stewardess could not be
strip searched).
108. See Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1963); People v. Seymour, 80 Ill. App. 3d 221, 398 N.E.2d 1191 (1979).
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proper. 0 9 However, even though the search is within a proper
scope, when no facts would lead a reasonable person to believe
that a weapon or evidence of the crime is hidden in the clothing,
a strip search extends beyond the permissible intensity for
searches,"l0
To analyze the constitutionality of strip searches, the courts
must balance the competing interests of the government's protection of society and its police officers and the individual's right
to privacy."' The governmental interest in disarming an arrestee and finding evidence which he could destroy or conceal is
not furthered by an arbitrary searching of all arrestees. Once it
has been determined that there is little reason to suspect that a
weapon or evidence of crime is being concealed, the government's interest is satisfied, and further searching must be prohibited." 2 Continued investigation has no utility other than to
complete the administrative procedure initiated by the arrest.
This justification for a search cannot be allowed to eradicate
3
one's reasonable expectation of privacy."
Unfortunately, there is no language in Robinson to guide the
courts in determining the validity of strip searches. Justice
109. Compare Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir.1968) (drugs
inadmissible because there was no clear indication for conducting the
search) and State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974) (refused to apply Robinson to search incident to arrest) with State v. Ramos, 11 Ariz. App.
196, 463 P.2d 91 (1969) (police had probable cause) and People v. Woods, 139
Cal. App. 2d 515, 293 P.2d 901 (1956) (restricted Rochin to brutality).
110. See United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972); People v.
Mercurio, 10 Cal. App. 3d 426, 88 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1970); cf.State v. Kaluna, 55
Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974) (a rule of reason must be applied to searches).
111. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979), where the Court
stated:
[TIhe permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests ....

[T~he reasonableness

standard

usually requires, at a

minimum, that the facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of
measurement against an "objective standard," whether this be probable cause or a less stringent test.
See also Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
112. United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972); State v. Kaluna,
55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974).
113. See notes 114-17 and accompanying text infra. But see United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235:
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a
search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification .. .
[W]e hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of
the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, but it is also a "reasonable" search under that
Amendment.
Some courts have relied on this language to justify strip searches. See note
40 supra.
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Rehnquist, in the majority opinion, stated that the search in that
case "partook of none of the extreme or patently abusive characteristics which were held to violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment in Rochin v. California."11 4 Justice
Powell concurred, noting that once the expectation of privacy
has been abated, any search of the person is lawful unless perpetrated abusively. 115 The question to be raised is whether police officers have tinrestrained power over the body of an
arrestee. Reading Robinson broadly, an officer may have unrestrained authority in his search. However, analysis is incomplete without considering prior fourth amendment restrictions
116
on the intensity of searches.
The analysis used in deciding fourth amendment claims is
helpful in resolving the constitutionality of a strip search. In
Robinson, the Court surveyed early doctrines which granted an
117
unlimited right to search once an individual was arrested.
114. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236; see Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952). But see notes 131-76 and accompanying text intra.
115. 414 U.S. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring). The Court, however, did not
overrule Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), where Mr. Justice Harlan
concurred, explaining:
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places." The question, however, is what protection it affords
to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference to a "place." My understanding of the rule that has
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement,
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a man's home is, for most
purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or
statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not
"protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the
circumstances would be unreasonable.
389 U.S. at 361. The lower courts concluded that the amendment created a
right to privacy in the person. E.g., United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 882
(9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Portillo-Reyes, 529 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States ex rel. Gedko v. Meer, 406 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Wis. 1975), appeal dismissed, 588 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1978). See generally LAFAVE, supra
note 3, at § 2.1.
116. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); see Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1979).
117. 414 U.S at 224-29. The Court first stated that the law has always recognized the right of an officer to conduct a thorough search pursuant to an
arrest. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143 (1972); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The
Court then proceeded to limit Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to its facts,
stating that there, the police did not have probable cause to arrest and that
the search was limited to a frisk. 414 U.S. at 227. It continued, claiming that
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The Court employed these precedents to justify its holding. In
Schmerber, however, the Court had concluded that these same
doctrines were not applicable to intensive searches of the body.
It held:
Whatever the validity of these considerations in general, they have
little applicability with respect to searches involving intrusions beyond the body's surface. The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such
intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require
law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.
* * * Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of
dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could be required
where intrusions into the human body are concerned .... The importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of
the issue whether or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.' 18
The Schmerber Court upheld the invasion, finding sufficient exigencies stemming from the dissipation of the blood-alcohol level
with the passage of time. Yet it is readily apparent from the
foregoing that, absent an emergency situation, Schmerber requires both a warrant and a "clear indication" before justifying
intensive searches of the body.
This is not simply persuasive authority. In border search
cases, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits use the "clear indication" test
in determining when body-cavity searches may be instituted" 19
and require a "reasonable suspicion" for strip searches. The rationale involved in border search cases is that there is a high
incidence of smuggling across the border, and in certain circumstances a strip search will likely uncover contraband. 20 This expectation, however, cannot be transferred to criminal suspects
who are arrested by police for other offenses. Smuggling is
rarely the primary activity for which these individuals are arwhen an officer has probable cause to arrest, a full search can be conducted.

Id. at 228.
118. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 769; see State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw.
361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974).
119. United States v. Mastberg, 503 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Mason, 480 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Briones, 423 F.2d 742
(5th Cir. 1970); Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968); Rivas v.
United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967).
For the test for strip searches, see People v. Woods, 139 Cal. App. 2d 515, 293
P.2d 901 (1956).
120. See McIntyre & Chabraja, supra note 7. But see Morales v. United
States, 406 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1969). Eighty per cent of the body-cavity
searches performed by customs officials at the border are unproductive.
Considering this, one must ask whether the fruits of the search do establish
probable cause. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
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rested. Consequently, it is difficult to visualize a person hiding
drugs in her underwear while driving a car, or extracting a
weapon from under the clothing while handcuffed and under police surveillance. 12 1 Experienced police officials are fond of saying that, indeed, strip searches turn up evidence and
weapons. 122 But no reputable studies have been made on this
subject,123 and in the absence of such studies, it is incumbent on
the courts not to accord these assertions too much weight in bal24
ancing privacy interests versus the need to acquire evidence.
Unfortunately, the clear indication test has been employed
only in cases involving physical penetrations of body surfaces. 125 Although Schmerber concluded that a more restrictive
test should be applied when the body surface is penetrated, that
rationale cannot be limited to such cases. Schmerber's rationale
126
was premised on the sanctity and dignity of the human body.
Certainly, the forced exposing of one's sexual and anal organs to
121. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (search of suspect's pockets not justified if police have neither probable cause to arrest nor reasonable suspicion that suspect is armed and dangerous); cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968) (frisk reasonable if suspicion of armed and dangerous).
122. See McIntyre & Chabraja, supra note 7. In the past year, many instances of strip searches based on less than probable cause have arisen.
See, e.g., Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (Racine, Wisconsin police strip searched an out-of-state woman for a traffic infraction).
See also Simon, supra note 1, at 56. Chicago police have for many years,
routinely strip searched women brought to the station for minor traffic offenses. Id.
123. One report resembling a study is McIntyre & Chabraja, supra note 7,
which is a survey of the Chicago Police Department practice of routinely
strip searching 20,000 female arrestees annually. Possibly if the police keep
accurate records pursuant to Illinois' new strip search law, there will be a
better basis for a study. See note 177 infra. But see Morales v. United
States, 406 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1969) (80% of the body-cavity searches perpetrated are unproductive).
124. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); see Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (cannot use fruit of crimes to support the search,
must have prior probable cause); cf. United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (cannot search if arrestee is able to post bond).
125. See People v. Woods, 139 Cal. App. 3d 515, 293 P.2d 901 (1956). Compare United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 902 (1977) and Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967)
("real" or "reasonable" suspicion tests) with Huguez v. United States, 406
F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968) (clear indication test).
126. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), where the Court
stated:
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusion on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication
that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may
disappear unless there is an immediate search.
Id. at 770; cf. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (concern for bodily
integrity).
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view by arresting officials is a gross invasion of that sanctity and
dignity. 127 The psychological effects of strip searches reportedly
resemble those suffered by rape victims. 128 Thus, Schmerber's
strict fourth amendment requirements should apply to strip
searches as well as body-cavity searches.
Requiring police to adhere to the warrant requirement for
strip searches would not be overly burdensome. Moreover,
there is no reason why a neutral figure such as a magistrate
should not be required to order these searches. 129 In most
cases, evidence hidden in a body cavity or underclothing, so that
a pat down would not detect it, could not be easily discarded
while the person is handcuffed. While at the station waiting for
a warrant, police officials can oversee arrestees who are believed
to be hiding drugs. Therefore, when there is probable cause that
evidence is being hidden, the police generally will have an opportunity to obtain a warrant without losing key evidence.
In the rare possibility that evidence is of such a nature that
it may dissolve within the body, then reasonable means could be
used to procure it. This exception is granted by Schmerber but
should be strictly limited by the courts. Furthermore, the
searches should only be conducted when there is a clear indication that evidence will be destroyed. This clear indication requires more than observing that the arrestee has glassy eyes, or
information based on rumors. Clear indication would necessi127. United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis.
1974); see Simon, supra note 1, at 56 (women suffered many of the after
effects that rape victims experience).
128. Simon, supra note 1, at 56.
129. Probable cause could exist when there are recent needle marks, see,
e.g., United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Summerfield, 421 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1970), or when there is information from
a reliable informant that the arrestee is a drug addict or carries drugs under
clothing, see, e.g., United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978)
(there was pretrial corroboration and it was not paid for); United States v.
Castle, 409 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1063 (1969); but see
United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis. 1974)
(information was several years old); or because it appears something is hidden under his clothing, see, e.g., United States v. Olcott, 568 F.2d 1173 (5th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Price, 472 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1973); or when the
arrestee acts contradictory and fits a mold of those bringing drugs in from
the border, see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 557 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1073 (1978) (defendant went on a one-day "vacation" to
Bogata, while carrying only one suitcase, was an unemployed truck-driver
and had a wife and child); United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977) (woman, traveling alone, wearing platform shoes, and returning after a very short stay in Columbia, gave evasive

and contradictory answers about her employment). Once the search
reaches the limits imposed by the probable cause requirement, the search

must cease. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 472 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1973);
State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974).
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tate that the official learned from a reputable source that drugs
are hidden on the suspect's body.
Without meeting these requirements, arrestees' fourth
amendment rights will be violated. The fact that only twenty
per cent of border strip searches are productive suggests that
the standards used are not stringent enough. 130 Adhering to the
Schmerber mandate of presenting probable cause to a neutral
judicial figure should protect the rights of individuals while safeguarding the interests of the state.
Rochin Due Process Analysis
The gross invasion inherent in a strip search not only violates one's expectation of freedom from search and seizure, but
it also violates that standard of decency and ordered liberty that
American society expects.' 3 ' A strip search therefore infringes
an arrestee's due process rights. 32 In substantive due process
analysis, the initial inquiry is whether there are fundamental
rights involved. The United States Constitution and its amendments impliedly create a right to privacy. 133 Although not an
enumerated right, it is recognized as an important one which is
accorded full constitutional protection. 3 4 This fundamental
130. Morales v. United States, 406 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1969). There is even

greater reason to suspect addicts and people crossing the border. But the
expectation lessens when in a non-drug related context. Then police should
have to sustain an even greater burden.
131. United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193, 198 (E.D.
Wis. 1974).
132. Id.
133. See note 7 supra.
134. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court invalidated
a Connecticut birth control prohibition on the basis of the right to privacy.
This right was seen as an implicit protection afforded by specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights. These guarantees were seen as creating zones of protection. Privacy is considered to be one such zone, without which several
provisions in the Bill of Rights would lose vitality.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), strengthened that position:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.
[However], the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or
a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices
have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment; in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments [e.g., Terry v. Ohio]; in the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights; in the Ninth Amendment [id.]; or in
the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 152. Roe v. Wade used this analysis to invalidate a Texas abortion
law. In doing so, the Court stated that any privacy right must always be

balanced against the interest of the state in regulating the public health and
safety. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court recognized
the right of privacy in the fourth amendment, holding that one is secure in
his person.
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right is violated by a strip search. 35 Yet, as in fourth amendment analysis, even though there is an invasion of privacy, it
must be balanced against the state's interest in protecting police
and gathering evidence of crimes. 136 In promoting these competing interests, states must be cognizant of the standards of
37
human decency.
In United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley,138 Judge Reynolds
used Rochin to declare a strip search unconstitutional. The
holding was grounded on the offensiveness of the actual strip
search and the abnormality of being forced to submit to the in139
spection of one's sexual organs by nonmedical personnel.
The district judge stated:
The police actions in this case abused common conceptions of decency and civilized conduct. It is true that the searches were carried out in what appear to have been sanitary conditions....
These facts, however, do not overcome several important facts. Petitioner, at the time of the searches, was seven months pregnant;
she was forced to bend over twice; and the two policewomen who
perpetrated the search were not medically trained .... 140
135. United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis.
1974). Even in the Ninth Circuit, where strip and body-cavity searches are
permitted, the circuit recognizes that the fourth amendment does create a
right to privacy, which is violated if there is no cause to search.
136. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
137. But see Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967), where the court held that a body-cavity search
instituted pursuant to a clear indication is not within the ambit of Rochin.
It stated:
Here the evidence shows a technical physical assault (in that
hands were laid upon appellant), but no degrading or shameful physical assault upon him, in the sense the Supreme Court found in Rochin,
supra. It was a technical assault similar to that upheld as proper in
Blackford, supra. Again, technically, the physical assault, the "gentle"
probing of the rectum, was not as pronounqed an assault, medically, as
the puncture of the skin in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). In
Breithaupt, the blood was taken while the appellant was unconscious.
But "the taking of blood by a skilled technician" is not "conduct that
shocks the conscience," nor such a method of obtaining evidence as offends a "sense of justice," said the Supreme Court, citing and distinguishing Rochin, supra, and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
The use of evidence in this case, like Rochin, Schmerber, Blackford,
et al. (in fact, in any case where a body cavity is gently, in a medically
approved manner, searched), does not (a) involve evidence of a testimonial nature; (b) require a defendant to testify against himself; (c)
constitute a denial of due process.
Id. at 711.
138. 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
139. Id. at 199. The court also paid particular attention to plaintiff's condition, being seven months pregnant and having difficulty bending over.
But see Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966) (not within

Rochin if conducted by medical personnel).
140. 385 F. Supp. at 198.
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It is difficult to predict the outcome of a suit which grounds its

objections in Rochin.141 The difficulty lies in the fact that the
Rochin test is very subjective. 142 In a search of a non-pregnant
woman who143was concealing drugs, a court may very well uphold
the search.

There is available, however, much authority which exalts
the sanctity of human dignity in our constitutional history.'"
Rochin is the most articulate expression of judicial thinking on
the due process clause. 45 It has not been overruled, nor has it
been substantially distinguished. 46 But sole reliance on one's
sensibilities is not enough. Rochin was premised on the shocking police brutality in pumping one's stomach. 1 47 In strip
searches, what is shocking is the gross invasion of privacy.
must be dealt with on a case
Whether it is sufficiently1 4shocking
8
by case basis as in

Guy.

Courts should not restrict the application of Rochin to
merely offensive police brutality. In White v. Rochford,'1 49 the
Seventh Circuit held that Rochin was premised on the due process clause. Therefore, it reasoned that it should be applied
whenever police arbitrarily deprive individuals of a recognized
right. 150 Clearly, the invasion of privacy is one such deprivation.
141. See, e.g., Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (limited Rochin to
brutality). Compare Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968)
and United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis.
1974) with Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 945 (1967).
142. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). At any given time it is
difficult to determine what is "violent" within due process standards, see
notes 161-69 and accompanying text infra, or whether other conditions
could create a violation of those standards of decency and ordered liberty
expected by our society. See notes 170-79 and accompanying text infra.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978) (a
stewardess); United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Leverette, 503 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1974).
144. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); see Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
145. E.g., 40 CALIF. L. REV. 311 (1952).
146. But see Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (limited Rochin to
its facts, that there was gross violence).
147. Id.
148. The "conscience" which has to be shocked in order to violate due
process is not the "community sense" which the court looks to in obscenity
cases, but rather, the sense of those minimal standards which are "of the
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at 172
(1952).
149. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979). In White, the court said: "Although state
actions prohibited under this due process analysis may involve incursions
on personal physical integrity, such as the induced vomiting disapproved by
the Court in Rochin, this need not always be the case." Id. at 383; see
Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972).
150. 592 F.2d at 385: "[Tlhe second aspect of the Due Process Clause's

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 13:273

Therefore, strip searching, at least when there is no probable
cause to believe that a weapon or evidence of crime is hidden
151
under clothing, is a violation of due process standards.
Courts must analyze those minimum standards which are
the essence of decency and ordered liberty. 152 A majority of
courts have been applying local standards of what is shocking to
the conscience-usually amounting to nothing more than the
153
opinions of judges as to the propriety of this type of search.
These cases have failed to apply "those canons of decency and
fairness which express notions of justice of English-speaking
15 4
peoples.'
The author advances the proposition that forcing an individual to submit to the indignity of a strip search based upon an
protection-the prohibition against state actions which 'shock the conscience' or run counter to the fundamental notions of fairness-would also
support a § 1983 cause of action here."
151. See United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.
Wis. 1974); cf. Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (violates
fourteenth amendment).
152. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at 172, where the Court explained:
In each case "due process of law" requires an evaluation based on a
disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the detached consideration of
conflicting claims, on a judgment not ad hoc and episodic but duly
mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in a
progressive society.
Cf. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (fundamental notions of fairness and justice); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401
(1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (those canons of decency and fairness
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples); Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (principles of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our peoples as to be ranked as fundamental).
153. Most of these cases involve Fifth and Ninth Circuit cases where the
courts have upheld strip searches. E.g., Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703
(9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (196V) (technical physical assault,
but no degrading nor shameful physical assault). But it must be
remembered that "awful tortures ... can be cloaked with such clockmark
logic that many become persuaded of their perverse justice. Turning
square corners then must never become a substitute for respecting the humanity of each individual." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 916-17
(1977).
154. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at 170. These cases have not failed to
recognize Rochin's doctrine. See Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366
(1968); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 945 (1967). But, they have not considered fundamental rights beyond
that of freedom from physical brutality. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S.
432 (1957); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d at 710, "it was the physical assault in Rochin which caused reversal ... yet, this is not, and should not be
limited to the law." Cf. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (those
arbitrary violations of fundamental rights). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring) (the due process clause should
not be subjected to "'personal' interpretation by judges whose constitutional outlook is simply to keep the Constitution in supposed 'tune with the
times.' ").
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officer's judgment alone falls far short of those canons.1 55 Likewise, the wholesale strip searching of women for minor offenses
violates these standards. 156 Courts should enforce a standard of
conduct upon police and border officials based on those canons
of decency, fairness, and of the notions of justice expected by
American society. The difficulty inheres in the attempted defini157
tion of those standards.
In attempting to outline these standards, three areas must
be considered. First, the courts must consider the violence involved in the police activity. 58 A strip search is prima facie violent. 159 Even where the subject willingly submits to a strip
search, the act is instigated by an official order. Failure to obey
may result in violence against the suspect. 60 The courts have
always condemned official violence and the circumstances giving rise to it.16 ' "As prosecutor, the state has no right to commit
any kind of violence upon the person, or to utilize the results of
such a tort. ... "162
Official violence is sanctioned in very limited and controlled
circumstances. It is permitted pursuant to a warrant, 163 by order of court, 64 in exigent circumstances such as when a suspect
is fleeing arrest, 1 65 or by legislative order. 66 Given that a strip
155. Such searches, if constitutional under due process analysis, can
only be performed when justified by the reasonableness of the discovery of
(1) weapons or instruments of escape; or (2) evidence which could be
otherwise concealed or destroyed. United States v. Edwards, 414 U.S. 213
(1974); United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Tinetti v. Wittke,
479 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
156. In the case of the Chicago strip searches, extensive press coverage
alerted the public to the practice of routine strip searches of females for
minor traffic and other regulatory infractions. See "Outrage in the Station
House," NEWSWEEK, March 3, 1979; public opinion against the practice was
so strong that it resulted in a law being passed by the Illinois legislature
curtailing these searches. See note 177 infra.
157. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring) (due
process standard is subject to subjective applications).
158. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); see Breithaupt v. Abram, 352
U.S. 432 (1957) (limiting Rochin); Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th
Cir. 1968) (strip searching not conducted in a hospital); Blefare v. United
States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
159. Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965); cf. United States ex
rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (pregnant woman);
Simon, supra note 1.
160. Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965); Simon, supra note 1.
161. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 774 (Fortas, J., dissenting); cf.
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 440 (1957) (court limited Rochin to the
violence involved therein).
162. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 774 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
163. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 765 (should have a neutral authority). See also id. at 774 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
164. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
165. Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1977); cf. Mat-
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search does involve a high degree of force or violence, the courts
should limit the practice. Requiring a warrant to strip search an
individual would not hinder police investigations, but it would
curtail the abuse of permitting any strip search.
Secondly, the court must examine the degrading effects of
such a search. 167 A strip search is inherently degrading. A
graphic account of what is entailed was provided by Judge
Reynolds in the Guy case. 168 The court held: "Applying these
tis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other groundssub
nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977), where the court stated, "The
state in this case, must demonstrate the existence of an interest equivalent
to, or greater than, the right of life to justify the use of deadly force against
fleeing felons." The rhetorical question therefore is must police then balance the need for evidence with the individual's right to privacy?
166. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-1(b), 114-5 (1977) (provides for Illinois
death penalty). But cf. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(state cannot impose mandatory death penalty, but must treat each person
as unique human being).
167. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 775; Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165; United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis.
1974); cf.Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968) (considered
harshness of search). See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
168. United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis.
1974), wherein the court reported these disgusting facts:
Petitioner was searched twice. The first search was the result of
entry into the petitioner's residence by several police officers pursuant
to a valid arrest warrant, subsequent observation by these police officers of various paraphernalia commonly utilized in the heating and
administering of heroin on petitioner's bedroom nightstand, and the
presence of vague information several years old that petitioner was
known to carry heroin in her vagina. This search took place in petitioner's own bathroom. At the time of the search, petitioner was clad
only in a nightgown and underpants. The two policewomen present directed petitioner to lift up her nightgown, remove her underpants, bend
over, and spread her buttocks. No touching occurred between the petitioner and the women officers. Since the bathroom was poorly lighted
and quite small and since the door was closed to insure privacy, the
policewomen were unable to conduct a thorough examination. It was
determined that petitioner should get dressed and another search
would be held at police headquarters, and the petitioner was taken to
the police headquarters to be searched.
The second search occurred a short time later in the vice squad
room at police headquarters. Again, the two women police officers were
present. Petitioner was asked to disrobe and bend over. To facilitate
her bending because of difficulty caused by her pregnancy petitioner
leaned on a chair. Officer Atkinson aided petitioner in spreading her
buttocks, and Officer Honeck held a flashlight. The former was wearing
rubber gloves, and the latter did not touch the petitioner. Officer Atkinson observed that there was a piece of cellophane protruding from petitioner's vagina. She requested that petitioner remove this from her
vagina. Petitioner complied by removing a small cellophane bag. At no
time did Officer Atkinson place a finger or a hand in any of the orifices
of petitioner's body. The period of time which passed between the arrest and the second search was approximately one hour.
The police actions in this case abused common conceptions of decency and civilized conduct. It is true that the searches were carried
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standards to the case at hand, I find that the instant situation
falls within the specter of Rochin. The actions of the Milwaukee
police shock the conscience of this court and this court's 'hardened' sensibilities."'169 But the effects of strip searches do not
end at the station. Reports indicate that being subjected to a
strip search causes many of the same psychological difficulties
experienced by rape victims. Intrusions into sexual privacy
have always offended; 170 customs have not been substantially al71
tered to condone such conduct today.
Finally, the courts must consider the punishment involved
in the search. 17 2 Before one can be punished for his acts, he
must be convicted. 173 A strip search can be punishment in and
of itself. To illustrate, consider an individual who is arrested,
but not ultimately charged. He will be strip searched without
any opportunity for judicial, or in most cases, medical supervision. After the unsuccessful strip search, he will then be released, one supposes, with an apology. 174 In some instances,
suspects were strip searched after they had posted bond and
were entitled to be released. Where there is no probable cause
to search for drugs or weapons, the effect of a strip search is
nothing but de facto punishment without a criminal act. 175 This
176
treatment is a clear example of a Rochin case.
out in what appear to have been sanitary conditions; that petitioner was
never forced to lie down; that she was searched by other females; and
that nothing was probed into any of her privates. These facts, however,
do not overcome several other important facts. Petitioner at the time of
the searches, was seven months pregnant; she was painfully forced to
bend over twice; and the two policewomen who perpetrated the search
were not medically trained, nor did they utilize medical facilities or
equipment to aid them in their search, nor was it done in a hospital or
medical environment.
Id. at 198.
169. Id.; see Simon, supra note 1.
170. Simon, supra note 1.
171. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726 (1978), where the Court held that the playing of George Carlin's
monologue "Dirty Words" constituted a violation of the FCC Regulations
against obscenity.
172. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Rochin was choked, he
had his stomach pumped, his door was broken in, and his human dignity
was violated. Before a person can be punished, he must be convicted. This
is required by due process and the Anglo-American tradition that a person
is innocent until proven guilty. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
173. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
174. Doe v. City of Chicago, No. 79 C 789 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
175. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf
Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965) (woman left lying in corner
crying after having clothes removed by male officers).
176. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
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LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES

Recently, Illinois and California have enacted legislation to
establish standards for conducting strip searches. The Illinois
statute17 7 was a direct response to the indiscriminate strip
searching of women for traffic violations in Chicago. The standards promulgated established requirements which officers
must meet before performing a strip or body-cavity search.
In analyzing this statute, one must distinguish between
strip searches and body-cavity searches. The statute forbids
177. P.A. 81-896, 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. (West) provides:
(a) After an arrest on a warrant the person making the arrest
shall inform the person arrested that a warrant has been issued for his
arrest and the nature of the offense specified in the warrant.
(b) After an arrest without a warrant the person making the arrest shall inform the person arrested of the nature of the offense on
which the arrest is based.
(c) No person arrested for a traffic, regulatory or misdemeanor offense, except in cases involving weapons or a controlled substance,
shall be strip searched unless there is reasonable belief that the individual is concealing a weapon or controlled substance.
(d) "Strip search" means having an arrested person remove or arrange some or all of his or her clothing so as to permit a visual inspection of the genitals, buttocks, anus, female breasts or undergarments of
such person.
(e) All strip searches conducted under this Section shall be performed by persons of the same sex as the arrested person and on premises where the search cannot be observed by persons not physically
conducting the search.
(f) Every peace officer or employee of a police department conducting a strip search shall:
(1) Obtain the written permission of the police commander or an
agent thereof designated for the purposes of authorizing a strip search
in accordance with this Section.
(2) Prepare a report of the strip search. The report shall include
the written authorization required by subsection (e); (1) the name of
the person subjected to the search; (2) the names of the persons conducting the search; and (3) the time, date and place of the search. A
copy of the report shall be provided to the person subject to the search.
(g) No search of any body cavity other than the mouth shall be
conducted without a duly executed search warrant; any warrant authorizing a body cavity search shall specify that the search must be performed under sanitary conditions and conducted either by or under the
supervision of a physician licensed to practice medicine in all of its
branches in this State.
(h) Any peace officer or employee who knowingly or intentionally
fails to comply with any provision of this Section is guilty of official misconduct as provided in Section 103-8; provided however, that nothing
contained in this Section shall preclude prosecution of a peace officer or
employee under another section of this Code.
(i) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as limiting any statutory or common law rights of any person for purposes of any civil action or injunctive relief.
(j) The provisions of subsections (c) through (h) of this Section
shall not apply when the person is taken into custody by or remanded
to the sheriff or correctional institution pursuant to a court order.
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strip searches for misdemeanors except those where the police
have a "reasonable belief' that the suspect is concealing a
weapon or controlled substances. The strip search must be conducted by members of the same sex as the arrestee, in a place of
privacy. Prior to a strip search, the officer must obtain the written approval of a commanding officer and must prepare a report
on the search. No body-cavity search may be performed except
by medical personnel after a judicial warrant has been obtained. 178 Intentional violation of the statutory provisions is
characterized as "official misconduct" and constitutes a class
three felony. 179 The statutory requirements are not applicable
"when the person is taken into custody by or remanded to the
sheriff or correctional institution pursuant to court order."'180
The statute has its strong points. The most important protection offered arises from the fact that every strip search must
be reduced to a writing and approved by a commanding officer.
Should an aggrieved individual have his rights violated, this record will facilitate a lawsuit at a later date. It also allows the legislature and the courts to monitor compliance with the statute
and will provide a basis for statistical studies of searches,
thereby enabling informed modifications of current judicial or
legislative views on this subject. The statute, quite commendably, demands a judicial warrant for body-cavity searches. This
requirement ensures that each body-cavity search will be based
upon "probable cause," a stricter standard than "reasonable belief."
In spite of the foregoing, the statute fails to grant individuals adequate protection against indiscriminate searches. Suppose that someone is strip searched after a lawful arrest for a
traffic violation. If the search is unproductive, the officer will always claim that he was operating under a "reasonable belief'
that the arrestee was carrying weapons or controlled substances. It would be very difficult to refute this contention in a
civil suit against the officer due to the high regard that judges
and juries place on police testimony. Nearly any fact could be
raised to support this "reasonable belief," such as red eyes, furtive gestures, prior record of narcotics convictions, or the judgment of an experienced officer. 18 ' This standard fails to meet
conventional fourth amendment requirements of probable
178. Id. § 103-1(g).
179. Id. § 103-8. In addition, a public officer or employee convicted of offi-

cial misconduct forfeits his office or employment.
180. Id. § 103-1(j).
181. Cf. Morales v. United States, 406 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1969) (only 20%
of the body-cavity searches performed by custom officials at the border are
productive).
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cause. Even in body-cavity searches at the border, a clear indication is required. 182 And it is much more likely that an individual would be secreting contraband on his body at the border,
than driving along a city street. Therefore, the Illinois standard
is deficient.
Civil suits aside, it would be impossible to convict an officer
under the Act for conducting a strip search without "reasonable
belief" that the arrestee was concealing weapons or contraband.
It would always be a case of the arrestee's word against that of
one or more officers. The state's attorney's burden of proof
would simply be too heavy. The only imaginable action by a police officer that would result in a conviction under this statute
would be if he routinely conducted strip searches. This is small
comfort to the individual subjected to abuse by police. Further,
if the strip search is productive, ipso facto reasonable belief is
substantiated. The fruits of the search thereby justify its perpe183
tration.
In fact, when the Chicago incidents were first publicized, police spokesmen claimed in every case that officers believed the
suspects were hiding drugs. 84 This is precisely the reason why
a "policeman's quick ad hoc judgment"' 85 should be subjected to
judicial scrutiny before the privacy of the individual is invaded.
Thus, the statute fails because it does not establish a warrant
requirement for strip searches.
The second problem with the Act is that it authorizes a strip
search predicated upon the class of the offense, thereby divorcing it from any consideration of probable cause. For example,
people may be freely strip searched if they are suspected of forgery, embezzlement, perjury, or any other felony where the individual is believed to be secreting a weapon or drugs upon his
person. This distinction is ridiculous.,
Stripped to its bare essentials, the Illinois law is too weak to
protect the individual subjected to a strip search. It has the fatal
182. Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386

U.S. 945 (1967) (real suspicion is enough for border strip search of person
crossing border, probable cause not required); see Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966) (clear indication test is more stringent than a reasonable
belief and less stringent than probable cause).
183. But cf.Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (an officer may
not stop every car at his whim, he must have probable cause to search);
People v. Superior Ct., 14 Cal. App. 3d 935, 92 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1971) (no search

is justified by the evidence it uncovers).
184. See note 23 supra.
185. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) ("police officer's determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he
has arrested is necessarily 'aquick ad hoc judgment' which the Fourth
Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an
analysis of each step in the search").
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defect of shielding strip searches from judicial scrutiny before
they occur. The police officer's judgment remains superior to
the individual's expectation of privacy. This was precisely the
law before the statute was passed.
Unlike Illinois, the legislation enacted in California was not
specifically designed to reduce the incidence of strip searches.
Rather, it represented the growing trend to decriminalize behavior and to streamline the judicial process by weeding out petty
cases before trial. 186 The California statute partially ameliorates
one problem, which still exists in Illinois, by limiting the instances whereby an individual may be arrested. The Penal
Code provides that any person arrested for a misdemeanor shall
be released with a notice to appear, rather than be incarcerated.187 The officer may still incarcerate the individual for any
other reason, 88 but he must state in writing why he did so, presumably for purposes of judicial scrutiny. Although this seems
to be a major loophole, the California courts have, independently of the statute, restricted the power of police to search
misdemeanants.' 89
Because this law provides for fewer arrests, there will be
necessarily fewer opportunities for the police to search individuals. This should reduce the incidence of strip searches. The
statute is an affirmative expression designed to limit the type of
extended contact with police that jeopardizes privacy rights.
However, a problem still exists because the statute, by its very
nature, does not base strip searches upon probable cause. Anyone arrested for a felony in California may be strip searched because the statute only applies to misdemeanors. Furthermore,
even misdemeanants may be incarcerated and thus subjected to
a strip search.
CONCLUSION

The law of strip searches is still in the development stage.
Public scrutiny has only recently been brought to bear upon this
flagrant misuse of law enforcement authority. Unfortunately,
the practice is not limited geographically. Many local strip
186. The maximum use of citations is encouraged by the Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 120.2(4). (Proposed Official Draft, 1975) and
the A.B.A. Standards Relating to Pretrial Release § 2.1 (Approved Draft,
1968). See generally Berger, Police Field Citationsin New Haven, 1972 Wis.

L. REV. 382; President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 133 (1967).
187. CAL. [PENAL] CODE § 853.6 (West 1976).
188. Id. §§ 852.6(g), (j).
189. E.g., People v. Rich, 72 Cal. App. 3d 115, 139 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1977). In
Rich, the court applied a standard of reasonableness.
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search policies draw support from the recommendations of national organizations. Nevertheless, comparatively few judicial
and legislative pronouncements pervade this area.
Determination of the legality of a strip search necessarily
requires examination of the interests and circumstances from
the viewpoint of both the governmental authority which conducts it and the individual subject. Justification for strip
searches has stemmed from the judicial exaltation of the state's
interests in protecting its police officers, securing its custodial
detention facilities, and preventing the secreting of incriminating evidence. Too often, the individual circumstance focused
upon is the class of offense that the arrestee is claimed to have
committed. Halting inquiry at that point, however, ignores the
crux of the strip-search problem, by failing to consider the personal and societal perspectives.
The judicial system must reorder its priorities within the
context of strip-search analysis. Courts should concentrate not
on the underlying criminal or regulatory violation by the particular person subjected to the degrading strip-search experience,
but on (1) the demeaning nature of these searches, regardless of
their targets; and (2) the conceded fact that most strip searches
are conducted, as a matter of routine, pursuant to blanket law
enforcement policies which transcend offense classifications,
without offering objective standards for gauging their propriety.
A strip search involving the visual exploration of body cavaties is dehumanizing and humiliating, even absent a repulsive
manual body-cavity probe. The shocking invasion of personal
privacy inherent in strip searches does not subside merely because one is arrested for an offense which, upon conviction, ultimately could result in incarceration. An individual should not
be subjected to the humiliation of a strip search based solely on
the fortuitous character of some underlying violation, when police engage in conduct so clearly deserving of universal reprobation. Stern judicial and legislative admonishments of these law
enforcement procedures are needed.

